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Abstract   
Recent empirical work in the field of university-industry technology transfer has stressed the 
importance  of  IPR-related  reforms  and  university  patenting  has  major  forces  behind  the 
success of US high-tech industry. European policy-makers have been tempted to explain the 
poorer  technological  performance  of  their  countries  with  the  lower  propensity  of  their 
academic institutions to get engaged in patenting and commercializing their research results. 
As a consequence, a number of measures have been taken to promote academic awareness of 
IPRs, as part of more comprehensive policies in favour of academic commercialization and 
entrepreneurship. 
This  paper  explores  university  patenting,  and  the  related  policies,  in  France.  We  provide 
evidence  that  university  patenting  in  that  countries  has  been  underestimated  by  policy-
makers’ perceptions: French academic scientists are in fact responsible for no less than 3% of 
patents by French inventors at the European Patent Office. However, only 10% of academic-
invented patents are owned by domestic universities, with the remainder assigned both to 
firms and to Public Research Organizations (PROs).  
We then explore the impact of the Innovation Act, passed in France in 1999. We find that the 
Act  has  significantly  increased  the  likelihood  an  academic  patent  to  be  assigned  to  a 
university rather than to a business company. We also find, that the opening of a technology 
transfer office in a university appears to have a stronger and more significant impact than the 
Act on the decision of universities to retain IPRs over their scientists’ discoveries. 
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1. Introduction  
National governments have increasingly considered academic institutions as key drivers of 
economic growth. In Europe several initiatives have been taken in order to strengthen the 
links between the Academia and the Industry and to increase technology transfer efforts by 
academic  institutions  and  faculty  members.  Many  of  those  initiatives  have  touched  upon 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) legislation and its relationship to university policy ranging 
from the abolition of the professor’s privilege in Germany, Austria and Denmark, to various 
initiatives to obtain more patenting disclosures and entrepreneurial initiative by the university 
faculties (OECD, 2003; Mowery and Sampat, 2005).  
These  IPR-related  reforms  have  been  mainly  informed  by  the  US  experience,  where 
universities have always been a major actor in the national system of innovation, one whose 
contribution to inventing and patenting has been recognized as central by a number of reforms 
introduced in the early 1980s..  
The  reforms  have  also  relied  on  the  assumption  that  encouraging  patenting  of  inventions 
stemming from academic research may enhance the universities’ contribution to innovation 
and economic growth. To the extent that inventions stemming from academic research mostly 
appears  as  prototypes  and  proofs  of  concepts,  they  need  further  investments  to  be 
commercialized; as a consequence, the argument goes, they need strong IPR protection in 
order to set the proper economic incentives in place  to induce industrial partners to pay for 
exclusive licenses and undertake expensive development investments1.  
Recent  studies  have  shown  European  policy-makers,  by  imitating  US  policies,  may  have 
failed  to  pay  proper  attention  to  the  legal  and  institutional  differences  between  European 
(especially Continental) universities and US ones. In particular, too much attention has been 
paid  on  patents  owned  by  universities  (university-owned  patents)  as  opposed  to  patents 
covering inventions by academic scientists, and assigned not only to universities, but also to 
the same scientists, public research organization or business companies (university-invented 
patents; surveys by Geuna and Nesta, 2006, and Verspagen, 2006). 
Recent studies have proved that common statistics on university-owned patents, which are 
most  often  called  in  to  support  the  above-mentioned  policy  initiatives,      underestimate 
drastically the patenting activity by academics, and the under-estimation is much more severe 
for Europe than for the US. Lissoni et al. (2008) suggest that university-owned patents in 
France, Italy and Sweden are no more than 11% of all university-invented patents (69% in the 
US), as opposed to 60%-80% business-owned patents (25% in the US). 
In this work we build upon Lissoni et al. (2008) in order to assess the impact of IPR-related 
reforms in terms of patent ownership.  In particular, we explore the consequences of  the 
introduction, in France, of the Innovation Act in France, in 1999. Among other things, the 
Innovation  Act  promoted  a  more  aggressive  patenting  activity  by  French  universities.  In 
particular, we test whether the Innovation Act has significantly increased the likelihood of a 
patent to be assigned to a university rather than to a business company or a public research 
organization. We also assess, in the same respect, the effect of a university establishing its 
first technology transfer office. 
The study is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide a brief review of the IPR-related 
reforms  of  university  policies  introduced  in  France  over  the  past  10  years,  with  special 
emphasis  on  the  Loi  Allegre  and  some  comparisons  with  similar  policies  in  the  US  and 
Europe. In section 3 and 4 we present the data and the econometric model used to examine the 
effect of the new law.. Section 5 contains the discussion of our results. Section 6 concludes, 
and outlines our directions for further research. 
 
                                                 
1 The evolution of patenting activity by US universities has been investigated, among others, by Henderson et al. 
(1998), Jensen and Thursby (2001),  and Mowery et al. (2004).    3 
2. IPR-related reforms of university policy 
 
Nowadays  the  importance  of  the  role  the  universities  and  public  research  organizations 
(PROs) have in producing, exploiting and commercializing technological applications based 
on knowledge stemming out of their research facilities is diffusely recognized. 
 
2.1 The international experience 
The USA was the first country to reconsider the role of universities and to amend a set of 
reforms aimed at improving the integration of these organizations in the national system of 
innovation. This process of reform began in the late '70s and saw its realization in the 1980, 
with the introduction of Public Law 96-517, better known as Bayh-Dole Act. The Act, among 
other  things,  allows  universities  to  retain  intellectual  property  rights  over  the  inventions 
resulting from federally funded research, and establishes the government’s march-in right, 
that  is  the  right  to  arrange  for  licensing  of  patents  left  unexploited  by  academic 
administrations.  This  legal  initiative  was  meant  to  provide  a  unique  set  of  rules  for 
universities that, until then, had to cope with several funding agencies (NIH, DoD, NASA, 
NSF, etc.), each of which with different policies in terms of IPRs assignment (Mowery et al. 
2001).  It  was  also  meant  to  provide  universities  with  both  stick  and  carrot  incentives  to 
commercialize their inventions (as a matter of fact, the stick, that is the march-in right, was 
hardly, if ever , used). More generally Bayh-Dole Act belonged to a wave of policies aimed at 
reinforcing the IPR regime in the USA, such as the extension of patentable matters to living 
organisms and to software, two fields where the academic contribution to invention stands out 
as prominent (Kortum and Lerner, 1999; Jaffe, 2000).  
After  the  passage  of  the  Act,  the  number  of  patents  issued  to  universities  increased 
tremendously, from 264 in 1979 to 2436 in 1997 (NSF, 2006), representing now 5% of the 
total  of  patents  issued  to  US  assignees.  In  addition,  the  number  of  universities  with  a 
technology transfer office has grown from 150 in 1991 to 400 in 1997 (AUTM, 2004). 
The  context  for  academic  patenting  in  Europe  differs  from  the  US  case.  The  British 
government was the first to emulate the US initiative: it introduced in 1985 the right for 
universities to patent and to commercialize the results of their own faculty. Previously, the 
British  Technology  Group,  a  public  agency,  had  the  exclusivity  on  the  inventions  by 
academics (Clarke, 1995).  
Shortly after,  at a time of constant or decreasing level of public financing of universities in 
Continental Europe, the latter were encouraged (or took the initiative) to look at markets for 
technologies  as  an  complementary  funding  source    (Geuna,  2001)
2.  Such  strategic 
reorientation  was  accompanied  in  some  countries  by  sets  of  reforms  in  IP  laws,  which 
allowed the granting of intellectual property rights to universities. Between 2000 and 2002 
Germany, Austria, Denmark passed a set of reforms on the ownership of the results stemming 
out  of  the  research  conducted  at  universities:  they  abolished  the  so-called  professor’s 
privilege, which allowed professors to retain IPRs over their research results and not to leave 
them to the employer (the university in this case)
3. On the other hand, Italy introduced the 
professor’s privilege in 2001 and slightly modified in 2005
4. 
                                                 
2 In Europe the system of government structural funds has been partially replaced by a more competitive manner 
of financing the public research system: indeed, since the late 1980s, the subvention of universities has relied 
more and more on problem-oriented  and  industry-oriented public programs rather than on public budgetary 
channels. This switch in sources of funds could be considered as the result of the shrinking of the public research 
budgets and the change in the rationale for science support occurred in Europe. 
3 National IP Laws state that the employers own the IPRs of the results from research conducted by employees. 
4 From 2005 the professor's privilege is not applied whenever the patent is the result of research financed by a 
non-academic  organization.  In  this  case  the  owners  of  the  patent  are  the  university  and  the  non-academic 
organization.    4 
 
2.2 The French experience 
In the case of France, the interest of government in a more participative role by the public 
research system had its roots in the 1970s and saw its early realization at the beginning of the 
1980s,  when  the  government  led  by  François  Mitterand  passed  the  Research  Act  (Loi 
d'Orientation  et  de  Programmation)  which  introduced  the  valorization  of  the  results  of 
research and its diffusion (art. 14, Public Law 82-610). The same indications were extended 
to universities two years later (Public Law 84-52). Indeed, the French public research system 
has  been  often  criticized  to  be  unable  to  transfer  the  excellent  results  of  research  to  the 
industry. It has been longly characterized by a strong intervention of the central government, 
which, through the large programmes, indicated and promoted the national independence of 
some  strategic  sectors  such  as  electronics,  defense  and  nuclear  technologies.  These 
programmes were put in practice by ad hoc agencies (CEA for atomic energy, INRA for 
agricultural research, CNES for telecommunication), which were under the direct control of 
the government. Besides these research agencies, the CNRS (National Scientific Bureau) and 
INSERM (National Institute of Health) were created with the target of supporting the weak 
and  unstructured  academic  system,  which  had  mainly  tasks  of  teaching,  and  had  the 
responsibility to develop, orient and coordinate all scientific activities in France. 
In  the  mid  1990s  the  government  was  still  concerned  about  the  cooperation  and  the 
knowledge  transfer  between  PROs  and  the  Industry.  Several  consultations  and  proposals 
(Fillon in 1994 and d'Aubert in 1997) led to the approval of the Public Law 99-597, also 
known as Innovation Act. This piece of legislation has been profoundly influenced by  the 
Guillaume report in 1998, which stressed the barriers that hampered the flow of knowledge 
between public research and industry. Briefly the Guillame Report suggested to adapt the 
public research system to the issues of technology transfer and to simplify the institutional 
context  in  which  it  would  occur.  It  proposed  a  clear  IPRs  policy  in  public  research 
institutions, the creation of specific entities devoted to manage industrial relationships, more 
researchers' mobility and a set of measures to foster firms' creations by researchers. 
Thus, the Innovation Act cannot be reduced to a change in the IP Law, nor it contains specific 
provisions on the matter. Rather, it aims, among other things, at increasing the awareness 
toward IPRs among the public research system and to facilitate their commercialization. It 
completes  the  1982  and  1984  acts  by  explicitly  adding  among  the  missions  of  such 
organizations the commercial exploitation of patents and licenses (art. 1, IV comma for PROs 
and art. 2, IV comma for universities). It also regulates the creation of technology transfer 
offices (TTOs), in order to administer research contracts with industrial partners (art. 2, I 
comma for universities).  
 
2.3 The Innovation Law in perspective: a short note on French universities 
In  order  to  appreciate  the  full  extent  of  the  institutional  differences  between  the  US 
universities (to which most available studies on university patenting refer) and the French 
ones, we find it useful to provide a few historical and institutional information on the latter.  
Differently  from  their  US  counterparts  (but  also  from  the  British  or  the  Dutch),  French 
universities  have  always  struggled  to  establish  themselves  as  central  actors  in  the  public 
research systems, let alone to gain the necessary autonomy to the purpose. After all existing 
universities had been closed under the Revolutionary regime at the end of the XVIII century, 
a new university (one for the entire country) was established by Napoleon at the beginning of 
the XIX. Under the name of Imperial University, the latter had exclusively teaching tasks, for   5 
the provision of medical doctors, teachers and lawyers
5. Such university was organized in 
regional faculties under tight State's control along rigid disciplinary lines. It was only in 1896 
the regional faculties gained the status of local universities and acquired some prominence in 
research. Still, research activities were conducted in small personal laboratories by a professor 
with a few assistants, and these laboratories constituted the body of academic R&D. The 
professors  responsible  for  these  specialized  laboratories  negotiated  directly  with  external 
partners to raise extra funds to carry on research projects (e.g. Pasteur in Lille). Those labs 
had limited chances to grow due the lack of autonomy of the universities that hosted them; in 
fact,  it  was  only  in  the  1970s  that  universities  gained  some  rights  to  self  organize  their 
activities (but not yet any freedom in terms of finance and real estate management, or faculty 
recruitment and career management).  
The responsibility of research, in France, has been traditionally assigned to specialized public 
institutes, often created around a new discipline or mission. In 1939 the Centre national de la 
recherche  scientifique (CNRS)  was  established  with  the  expressed  goal  of  supporting 
academic research and/or performing research through its own labs. During the 1960s both 
demographic factors and a call for democratisation of education took to a massive enrolment 
to  universities  which  caused  the  isolation  of  larger  and  better  endowed  laboratories  from 
teaching;  in  the  meanwhile  the  CNRS  and  INSERM  (the  National  Institute  of  Health) 
established a system of partnership between universities personnel and its research groups, on 
the basis of a periodic evaluation by its committees. This kind of mechanism, which has been 
extended over time, has led on one hand to split the academic environment between teaching 
vs. research departments, and, on the other hand, to the integration of the agencies personnel 
in university research groups: larger and better connected laboratories received financial and 
material assistance from CNRS and INSERM. Thus a vertical hierarchy of labs exists: those 
staffed only by CNRS personnel and funded directly by CNRS and the Ministry of Education; 
those staffed by both CNRS and university personnel; and finally those exclusively staffed by 
university personnel, with no to little access to CNRS funds (Laredo and Mustar, 2001). In the 
last decade the whole system has witnessed several changes: the number of faculty members 
increased to more than 50000 researchers, whereas the totality of PROs employs less than 
35000. As a matter of comparison, during the 1970s the sole CNRS had as many researchers 
as the entire university system. Moreover, a second trait of the academic system, the elite 
educational  mission  of  the  grandes  écoles  and  its  separation  from  research,  seems  to  be 
disappeared.  As  Laredo  and  Mustar  (2001)  state,  one  out  of  five  Ph.D.  theses  across  all 
disciplines is produced in the research centres of these schools, even though they only account 
for 6% of all teacher researchers. 
These historical remarks have a number of implications for our study. They suggest that the 
Innovation  Act  is  one  of  many  steps  taken  in  France  to  promote  more  autonomy  for 
universities,  and  less  dependence  on  CNRS  and  INSERM.  Therefore  we  test  whether  its 
introduction helped universities to retain the property a higher share of university-invented 
patents, in particular by subtracting them to the exclusive control of large PROs. In the same 
perspective, we do not  expect universities to have  gained  IPR  control  at the  expenses of 




                                                 
5 Besides universities, higher education is the task of the Grandes Ecoles, which enjoy more prestige than 
universities and take care of the formation of the technical and administrative elites, with very limited 
involvement in research activities (Chesnais, 1993).   6 
The core data employed in this study come from the KEINS database, which is part of a 
broader database, EPO-INV database
6. The French KEINS database on academic inventors 
provides detailed information on faculty members in France who appear to be among the 
inventors of one or more patents applied for at EPO – European Patent Office – between 1994 
and 2002. It is the result of the match of the names of scientists and engineers with tenured 
positions
7 in 2005 with names of inventors of EPO patents. The faculty name were provided 
by BETA (Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée), a research unit of Université “Louis 
Pasteur”  in  Strasbourg,  contains  Ministerial  records  for  both  medical  and  non  medical 
disciplines (32006 associate professors and full professors in hard science disciplines). 
In  order  to  obtain  the  KEINS  database,  we  firstly  matched  inventors  from  the  EP-INV 
database with professors in the national list of professors, by name and surname; we then 
filtered  out  incongruous  inventor-professor  matches  by  employing  “age”  and  “discipline” 
filters. The “age filter” implied that by the moment of the first patent claim by a “suspected” 
matched professor, the latter was older than 21. The “discipline filter” was based on a list of 
incompatible disciplines and IPC 3-digit codes.  
After matching the two databases, and obtaining pairs of professor-inventor, we checked for 
homonymy by contacting the professor-inventor matches by e-mail or by telephone. Given 
the large numbers of professor-inventor pairs, we chose to focus only on those pairs wherein 
the inventor’s last patent had been filed after 1993, since we considered them more likely to 
be still active and reachable. This choice left us with 3951 inventor-professor pairs ‘To be 
checked’.  For  2400  pairs  information  was  collected  either  through  direct  contact  or  by 
examining the professors’ CV (when available), her publications and/or the patent applicants’ 
websites  (2400);  for  484,  the  required  information  was  provided  by  their  academic  co-
inventors. For 1067 pairs, corresponding to 587 professors no information was available, nor 
the professors ever answered to our e-mails or telephone calls
8.  
More  than  1700  patent  applications  have  1208  French  faculty  active  in  2005  among  the 
inventors. They respectively represent 3.27% of all French patents and 2.33% of domestic 
inventors.  Most  of  the  patents  are  in  the  fields  of  Instruments,  Chemistry  and 
Pharmaceuticals,  respectively  20.07%,  25%  and  28.5%.  Their  authors  come  mainly  from 
academic disciplines related to the life sciences and electronics.  
 
Table 3.1: French academic patenting activity between 1994 and 2002 
 






Inventors  53285  51839  1,028 
Academic 
Inventors  1744  1208  1,444 
Share of  
Accademia  3,27%  2,33%   
 
 
                                                 
6 Lissoni et al. (2006) describe in detail the methodology of patent classification for inventors of the EP-INV 
database and the methodology applied to construct the KEINS database on academic inventors. 
7 By tenured position, we refer to all “maitre de conferénce” and “professeur” 
8 Additional information on the universities employing our academic inventors was collected from the database 
of CURIE, the French network of technology transfer offices.    7 
Table 3.2:  Distribution of academic patents in DT-7/OST technology classification 
   
 
As explained by Lissoni et al. (2008), these values do not differ much from those of Italy and 
Sweden. These findings are in line with Owen-Smith and Powell (2001), who found that 




Table 3.3: Distribution of academic patents by aggregated disciplines  
 
The  patents  are  more  than  the  actual  number  since  inventors  from  different  disciplines 
appeared in the same patents.  
 
 
Assignees of university-invented patents can be classified in three categories: 
-  Companies (C), which include not only business companies, but also individual and 
foreign assignees; 
-  Institutions  (INST),  such  as  domestic  PROs,  known  in  France  as  Etablissements 
Public  à  Caractère  Scientifique  et  Technique  (EPST)  or  Etablissements  Public  à 
Caractère Industriel et Commercial (EPIC), and listed on the website of the French 
Ministry of Research; 
-  Universities  (UNI),  as  listed  in  the  same  database  from  which  we  extracted  the 
professors’ names and info. 
PATENTS INVENTORS
24,38% 251 14,39% 14448 218 1,93% 1,51%
INSTRUMENTS 6823 12,80% 350 20,07% 9189 341 5,13% 3,71%
CHEMISTRY 6729 12,63% 436 25,00% 8951 343 6,48% 3,83%
PHARMACEUTICALS 5363 10,06% 497 28,50% 6352 399 9,27% 6,28%
PROCESS ENGINEERING 6784 12,73% 138 7,91% 7941 145 2,03% 1,83%
MACHINERY AND TRANSPORT 9431 17,70% 58 3,33% 10456 44 0,61% 0,42%
OTHERS 5164 9,69% 14 0,80% 4889 11 0,27% 0,22%











AGGREGATED DISCIPLINES Patents (X) Inventors (Y) Professors (Z) Y/Z X/Y % Patents
MATHEMATICS 72 35 6270 0.56% 2,06 3.77%
PHISICS 125 67 2660 2.52% 1,87 6.54%
CHEMISTRY 545 321 3829 8.38% 1,7 28.50%
EARTH SCIENCES 2 1 1090 0.09% 2 0.10%
BIOLOGY 356 228 5445 4.19% 1,56 18.62%
LIFE SCIENCE 397 246 6181 3.98% 1,61 20.76%
ENGINEERING 32 31 2052 1.51% 1,03 1.67%
ELECTRONICS 383 279 4324 6.45% 1,37 20.03%
ALL DISCIPLINES 1912 1208 31851 3.79% 1,58 100.00%  8 
Since patents can be co-assigned to multiple assignees, some patents fall in more than one of 
the  above  mentioned  categories  at  the  same  time,  whenever  the  co-assignees  belong  to 
different categories. We will come back to this problem in section 4. 
 
Table 3.4 shows the high share of companies’ ownership, almost 69%.; institutions, with the 
exclusion of universities, hold over 21% of the patents, which leaves to universities no more 
than 10% of university-invented patents (unit of observation here is not the patent, but the 
applicants).  Notice  that  this  result  does  not  differ  much  from  what  found  by  Gering  and 
Schmoch  (2003)  for  Germany,  another  country  whose  public  research  system  sees  PROs 
playing a key role, and universities enjoying very limited autonomy. 
 
   
Table 3.4:  Property distribution of academic patents by DT-7/OST technology domains 
 
Patents  co-owned  by  different  typologies  of  applicants  are  counted  as  many  times  as  the 
typologies of applicants. 
 
It is worth pointing out that the ownership distribution of university-invented patents is not 
uniform across technologies. Universities appear as applicants for 14% of the patents in the 
Pharmaceutical  domain  and  for  11%  of  those  in  Instrumentation,  but  only  for  5%  in 
Chemistry  Companies  have  a  disproportionate  high  share  of  patents  in  Chemistry  (78%), 
Machinery and Transportation (83%) and Electronics (78%). Patents applied by PROs are 
mainly in the field of Pharmaceuticals. 
Owen-Smith and Powell (2001) and Feldman and Desrochers (2003) show that university 
characteristics matter when dealing with university patenting. We take this into account when 
we turn to academic patenting. In Table 3.5 we employ the French Ministery for Research 
classification, which distinguishes between Schools of Engineering, Grands Etabilissements, 
Instituts  Nationals  Politechniques,  Universities  with  medical  school,  Universities  without 
medical school and Scientific Universities.  
Faculty members in universities with medical school patent overall in the technology class of 
Pharmaceuticals  (40%  of  the  patents);  on  average  only  10%  of  the  patents  from  other 
institutions  are  in  the  same  domain.  The  patenting  activity  in  scientific  universities  and 
universities without medical school is mainly concentrated in Chemistry, about 40%. Grandes 





TECHNOLOGY CLASSES C INST UNI %C % INST % UNI
ELECTRONICS 237 44 23 77,96% 14,47% 7,57%
INSTRUMENTS 331 86 49 71,03% 18,45% 10,52%
CHEMISTRY 391 85 25 78,04% 16,97% 4,99%
PHARMA 378 209 93 55,59% 30,74% 13,68%
PROCESS ENGINEERING 110 40 25 62,86% 22,86% 14,29%
55 4 7 83,33% 6,06% 10,61%
OTHERS 13 1 0 92,86% 7,14% 0,00%
TOT 1515 469 222
% 68,86% 21,32% 10,09%
MACHINERY & 
TRANSPORT  9 
 






4. The econometric model 
In order to assess whether the introduction of the Innovation Act in 1999 has changed the 
behaviour of domestic PROs and universities in retaining intellectual property right over those 
discoveries  stemming  out  of  in-house  research  projects,  we  use  econometric  probability 
models, in particular multinomial logit models, wherein patent assignment is related to a set 
of characteristics of the patent, the university the inventor belongs to, the region in which the 
university  is  located  and  to  time-controlling  variables  in  order  to  catch  the  effect  of  the 
introduction of the legal initiative and the opening of technology transfer offices in those 
universities whose faculty members appear among the inventors of a patent after 1994. 
For  the  purposes  of  the  econometric  analysis  we  divided  patent  assignments  into  five 
categories, which result from the combination of the types of owners described in section 3 
and are assigned as many values when treated as dependent variable (OWNERSHIP) in our 
regressions:  
exclusive INST ownership (value=1)  
exclusive C ownership (value=2) 
UNI ownership, either exclusive or joint with INST (value = 3) 
Joint INST and C ownership (value=4) 
Joint UNI and C ownership (value=5) 
 
The reason not to deal with exclusive UNI ownership, and to consider it together with the 
case of joint UNI and INST property, is that very few patents are assigned exclusively to 
universities.  In  fact,  universities  that  are  most  active  in  research  usually  host  a  CNRS 
laboratory, wherein academic and CNRS researchers work jointly. 
 
The key explanatory variables of interest in the regression are: 
-  ACT, which takes zero value when the patent application occurred between 1994 and 
1998 and one in and after 1999, that is after the introduction of the Innovation Act;  
TECHNOLOGY CLASSES
UNI_TYPE  ELECTRONICS INSTRUMENTS CHEMISTRY PHARMA OTHERS TOT
Schools of Engineering Patents 30 27 54 23 30 8 0 172
% 17,96% 16,17% 32,34% 13,77% 17,96% 4,79% 0,00% 100,00%
Grandes Ecoles Patents 21 8 5 5 1 6 1 47
% 91,30% 34,78% 21,74% 21,74% 4,35% 26,09% 4,35% 100,00%
Instituts Nationals Politechniques Patents 20 20 39 8 17 5 0 109
% 68,97% 68,97% 134,48% 27,59% 58,62% 17,24% 0,00% 100,00%
Universities (medical school) Patents 139 251 215 470 70 26 12 1183
% 81,29% 146,78% 125,73% 274,85% 40,94% 15,20% 7,02% 100,00%
Universities (no medical school) Patents 24 35 71 25 13 10 0 178
% 160,00% 233,33% 473,33% 166,67% 86,67% 66,67% 0,00% 100,00%
Scientific Universities Patents 38 59 116 31 28 5 1 278
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-  TTO, coded as one when an internal  IPR regulation, proxied by the opening of a 
fonction de valorisation, is introduced in an university
9.    
 
We expect both variable to bear a positive influence on the probability of OWNERHSIP to 
take value 3 or 5. 
 
Among control variables, many represent university-specific characteristics, and pose a few 
technical problems. Whenever a patent lists only one academic inventor, or more than one 
academic co-inventors, all of them affiliated to the same university, the creation of university-
specific control variables is straightforward.  
On  the  contrary,  with  patents  by  more  than  one  academic  co-inventors  from  different 
universities we had to make a few complex choices. In particular, we exploited the dates of 
nomination to the current position of the professors: if the date of nomination of one academic 
inventor  is  later  with  respect  to  the  priority  date  of  the  patent,  then  it  is  likely  that  the 
professor  used  to  work  for  the  university  of  the  professors  nominated  previously  to  the 
priority  date.  If  still  no  conclusion  can  be  reached,  the  reputation  of  the  universities  of 
affiliation of the co-inventors played a critical role: we have to remark that this criterion of 
choice, totally subjective, was employed marginally. 
In a few cases, when an academic-owned patent was claimed by two or more universities, we 
assigned the patent to the “pivotal” university, that is the university which had a major role in 
determining the choice of applying for it: we did it on the basis of the patenting history of the 
universities appearing as assignees.       
A set of controls refer to the technological contents of the patent. In particular, we introduced 
two  dummies  for  patents  in  Biotech  and  Pharmaceutics  (BIO)  and  Scientific  and 
Measurement Instruments (INSTR)  
Other variables control for the standing of the institution where the academic inventor come 
from.  As  mentioned  in  section  2,  the  French  higher  education  system  includes  both 
Universities,  Schools  of  engineering  and  Grands  Etabilissements,  each  category  having  
different domestic and international reputation and visibility, and different involvement in 
research. At the same time, there are peculiarities within every group of academic institutions. 
In order to deal with them, we employ the French Ministery for Research classification, from 
which we derive dummy variables for: 
-  Schools of Engineering and Instituts Nationals Politechniques (ENG) 
10 
-  Grands Etabilissements (GRET) 
-  universities with medical school (UNI_MED) 
-  universities without medical school (UNI_NON_MED)  
-  scientific universities (SC_UNI).  
 
We control also for university size. We expect larger universities to apply directly for more 
patents, because better equipped in dealing with IPRs issues. Furthermore, we would expect 
domestic PROs to collaborate with the most prominent universities, likely to be the largest, 
but  at  the  same  time,  since  invested  by  the  mission  of  sustaining  the  university-research 
system (at least for CNRS), to be of crucial relevance  for research projects in small and 
medium-sized universities. The variable SIZE takes value one for the 25% of universities with 
the largest number of hard-scientists in 2005
11. 
                                                 
9 Sourced from the BETA-EcoSc database. 
10 Since the Instituts Nationals Politecniques are only three, we group them with the schools of engineering, 
given that they are involved in the same fields of research. 
11 Albeit professors mobility, happening overall during the first years of a professor’s career, and the variation of 
the absolute size of universities along the nine years of analysis, we cannot surely affirm that the relative size   11 
The  last  characteristic  of  French  universities  we  want  to  control  for  is  the  universities’ 
traditions and attitudes with respect of IPRs. Owen-Smith and Powell (2001) look for reasons 
explaining  the  different  rates  of  invention  disclosure  by  academics  at  two  American 
universities, with different institutional status. Among the reasons behind the gap in terms of 
disclosure, they find that “the technology transfer process and capacity on each campus is 
shaped by the unique histories and environments that characterize each institution”(Owen-
Smith  and  Powell,  2001;  p.  105).  We  borrow  the  rationale  of  this  statement,  and,  to 
contextualize it, we construct three control variables: C_INT, INST_INT and UNI_INT. All 
three variables are calculated as the stock of inventors which signed patents for respectively 
companies, domestic PROs and universities, at each point in time, divided by the number of 
hard-science academics affiliated to a given university. The stock is lagged of one year. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Example of the calculation of the number of inventors per typology of applicant. 
 





























Other control variables were produced from data sourced from both the website of the French 
Ministry of Research and from the National Bureau of Statistics in order to take into account 
regional characteristics: we used an average of regional GDP over the period 1992-2002. 
Similarly,  variables  for  private  expenses  in  R&D  and  public  expenses  in  R&D  were 
introduced. We then gave the value of one to those patents signed by academic affiliated to 
universities  located  respectively  in  the  largest  regions  and  those  regions  with  the  highest 
intensity of private and public R&D. We employed the same criterion used to identify the 
largest universities. 
 
Summing up, our regression will be: 
OWNERSHIP = f (BIO, INSTR, ENG, GRET, INP, UNI_MED, UNI_N_MED, SC_UNI, 





                                                                                                                                                          
changed: largest universities, such as Paris VI, Lyon I, Toulouse III, Grenoble I and Strasbourg I were and still 
are among the most scientifically productive universities of France .  
12 A list of the variables and descriptions is provided in the Appendix (table AX.1).   12 
5. Results 
The results in the first column of table 5.1 are referred to patents assigned to PROs. The 
variable ACT is not significant, and this outcome could be explained by twenty  years of 
patenting by PROs preceding the passage of the act. Indeed, during the 1970s the government 
set up several agencies specialized in transferring the research capabilities accumulated in the 
public  sector  to  industry.  The  most  important  of  these,  the  ANVAR,  manages  patent 
portfolios  and  finds  industrial  partners  for  both  the  CNRS  and  university  laboratories. 
Therefore the patenting activity is not new at PROs in 1999, when the Innovation Act passed.  
   
Table 5.1: Results of the Multinomial logit regression (outcomes are expressed in odds ratios) 
 
(* = 10% significance, ** = 5% significance, *** = 1% significance).  
Categories: 1=PRO applicant; 2=Company applicant; 3=University applicant; 4=PRO and 
Company applicant; 5=University and Company applicant. Base category is 2=Company 
applicant.  
1) The reference category is university with medical school. 
 
In addition, patents in the technological domain of Pharmaceuticals are more likely to be 
retained by PROs with respect to other technology classes. The coefficient of BIO is both 
positive and significant at 1%. 
Patents are more likely to be assigned to PROs in universities with medical schools rather 
than in scientific universities. Indeed, by looking at the technological distribution of patents 
over university typology, we can observe that almost half of the patents signed by the faculty 
of universities with medical schools are in the domain of pharmaceuticals, which is also the 
domain  in  which  PROs  have  the  highest  share  of  academic  patents.  On  the  other  hand, 
scientific universities are more involved in the technology class of Chemistry, in which over 
70% of academic patents are claimed by the Industry. This result can be interpreted as being 
in line with the latest finding: life science is of crucial importance for patenting at Public 
Research  Organizations.  The  coefficient  associated  to  the  dimension  of  the  university  is 
positive but statistically not significant. The statements by Chesnais (1993) regarding a major 
Odds Std. Err. Odds Std. Err. Odds Std. Err. Odds
Ptype 1 3 4 5
0,73 0,73 2.294 * 1,12 0,94 0,57 1,33
1,21 0,56 3.351 * 2,48 1,89 1,63 1,41
0,7 0,23 2.356 * 1,16 0,94 0,62 0,65
0.651 * 0,15 0,91 0,29 0,78 0,31 1,33
C_int 1414.188 * 5447,16 0 * 0 46,36 290,97 9.06E-07
Inst_int 112,19 695,84 3.94E-07 4.03E-06 205,43 2154,22 1840391
Uni_int 1.54e+12 ** 1.83E+13 4.81e+21 *** 6.23E+22 3.90E-06 0 4.25e+15 *
Gdp 1,41 0,33 1,21 0,26 1.818 * 0,63 1,25
Prrd 1,19 0,31 1,28 0,4 0.503 * 0,21 0,69
Pbrd 0.686 ** 0,13 1,16 0,29 1,69 0,58 0,9
Instr 1,2 0,23 1.712 ** 0,41 1,01 0,38 1,21
Bio 2.037 *** 0,33 3.501 *** 0,77 3.869 *** 1,05 2.345 **
Act 0,8 0,15 1.997 *** 0,44 1,21 0,38 2.345 *
Tto 0,81 0,13 2.654 *** 0,6 0,83 0,23 1,27
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collaboration between larger and better connected universities and PROs do not appear to be 
valid.  
To conclude, PROs are likely to retain IPRs at universities located in larger regions, proxied 
by the regional GDP. The variable GDP has a positive and 10% significant coefficient. The 
variable PBRD, which is a proxy of the public R&D intensity of a region displays the same 
significance as above, 10%, but inverse direction: a possible interpretation of this finding 
could  rely  on  the  importance  of  PROs  in  patenting  for  regions  with  low  levels  of  R&D 
expenses, being public or private.   
 
When dealing with the likelihood of a patent to have as applicant a university rather than a 
company, both the variables referring to institutional changes turn to be significant, at 1%, 
and positive. Results are reported in the second column of table (number to define). The most 
striking difference with the outcome previously shown is the significance of ACT and TTO. 
By 1999, French academic institutions start being more aggressive in IPRs retention than they 
did before. The passage of the Innovation Act have led to an higher involvement of Academia 
in IPRs administration; the same occurred also when a university introduced an internal IPR 
regulation. Indeed, patents applied for after the opening of a technology transfer office – TTO 
–, proxy of an internal IPR regulation, are more likely to be assigned to the university the 
academic inventor is affiliated to. The result is in line with Baldini et al.’s (2006) findings for 
Italy, where the total number of patents owned by universities increased after the adoption of 
an internal IPR regulation (which often was contextual to the creation of a TTO). The absence 
of effects of the Act on academic patenting by PROs and the rise in terms of weight of 
universities result in a relatively minor importance of private patents signed by academics, so 
that possible explanations of this phenomenon could be a stricter control by universities over 
those professors who have ties with the Industry and over professors which are used to apply 
for patents individually.       
As noted earlier for patents claimed for by PROs, patents belonging to the technology class of 
Pharmaceuticals are more likely than patents in other technology classes to be applied for by 
universities. We can also observe the same result for patents in the technology domain of 
Instrumentation. Dealing with university characteristics, schools of engineering and grands 
établissements are more likely than universities with medical schools to appear as applicants 
of patents signed by their faculty, whilst, in line with our expectations, an environment in 
which  patenting  for  Academia  is  widely  diffused  positively  influences  the  probability  of 
assignment to universities (UNI_INT positive and significant at 1%).  
The dimension of the academic inventor’s university is slightly significant (just over 10%): 
larger universities seem to be more likely than smaller universities to appear as assignees of 
academic-invented patents. This low level of significance is partly due to the fact that Schools 
of  Engineering  and  Grands  Etablissements,  which  have  on  average  fewer  researchers 
affiliated than public universities, pay great attention to IPR issues, as shown above. With 
regards to regional characteristics, the outcomes are somehow different to those previously 
obtained for academic patents whose applicant is a PRO. None of the regressors referring to 
them is significant, albeit showing a positive direction of the sign.  
These results confirm the current view of academic institutions being more and more involved 
in  IPRs  retention  and  management,  and  of  being  responsive  to  institutional  changes 
encouraging them. 
As stated earlier, the act does not affect the IPR attitude of PROs at French universities. The 
likelihood a patent to be applied both by a PRO and a company is not influenced by the 
passage of the act: ACT is positive but not significant, whereas the sign of the coefficient 
associated  with  the  opening  of  a  technology  transfer  office  is  negative,  and  still  not   14 
significant.  Such  a  result  witnesses  the  critical  role  of  PROs  as  founders  of  research  at 
universities laboratories and continuous collaboration between the two entities. 
Academic patents in the Pharmaceuticals sector are the most likely to have both a PRO and a 
company as applicant (again, the issue of the centrality of biotechnologies for patenting at 
PROs); furthermore, faculty affiliated to universities in larger regions tend to be the inventors 
of patents co-owned by PROs and companies. We can also observe a negative impact of 
private spending in R&D on the probability a patent be co-owned (PRRD significant at 10%): 
this is probably due to an indirect effect on the likelihood by public expenses in R&D (it has 
to be mentioned that the p-value associated to PBRD is only slightly higher than 10%). 
The probability of a patent to be applied jointly by universities and companies dramatically 
increased  after  the  passage  of  the  Innovation  Act.  The  variable  ACT  is  positive  and 
significant at 5%. This outcome is quite straightforward, given that, as previously seen, with 
the passage of the Innovation Act the Academia displays more interest in IPR issues. This is 
particularly true for patents in pharmaceuticals (BIO positive and significant at 5%). Contrary 
to sole university-owned patents, the opening of a TTO does not change the likelihood a 
patent being co-applied by universities and firms. 
A further doubt emerges when we point out these results: who is responsible for this shift in 
the property pattern of academic patents? Is it the case that universities already engaged in 
IPR management became more aggressive in IPRs issues after the passage of the bill? Or is 
this surge in academic-owned patents due to new entrants? 
To answer this questions we employed the same model as above, but applied only to those 
universities that opened a technology transfer office before the Innovation Act was approved, 
expecting them to be more responsive to such change.  The results in table 5.2 are consistent 
with our expectation: the passage of the act has both a positive and significant, at least at 1%, 
effect  on  the  likelihood  a  patent  is  assigned  to  universities.  By  1999,  French  academic 
institutions already involved in IPRs issues appear to be more aggressive in IPRs retention 
than they did before. As we expected, the higher propensity to seek for intellectual protections 
resulted in the table 5.1 is to attribute to established universities, and not to new entrants, 
which are not yet ready to effectively manage such an institutional change. 
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Table 5.2: Results of the Multinomial logit regression (only universities with a TTO open 
    before 1999) 
 
(* = 10% significance, ** = 5% significance, *** = 1% significance).  
Categories: 1=PRO applicant; 2=Company applicant; 3=University applicant; 4=PRO and 
Company applicant; 5=University and Company applicant. Base category is 2=Company 
applicant.  
1) The reference category is university with medical school. 
 
A striking difference with the outcomes in table 5.1 is the non significance of the variable 
ACT  when  dealing  with  academic  patents  co-applied  by  universities  and  companies.  The 
passage of the Act does not seem to change the attitude toward  IPRs  when an industrial 
partner is involved.   
When considering geographical characteristics, it emerges that the universities in regions with 
high level of private R&D spending are more likely to apply directly for patents. The high 
effort  in  innovation  by  the  firms  in  these  regions  and  long  lasting  collaborations  with 
academic laboratories could be a possible explanation of this outcome. The opposite holds for 
public R&D spending
13.  
Other outcomes are in line with the previous results: an academic environment supportive of 
patenting  fosters  the  innovative  activity  of  the  faculty  (UNI_INT  significant  at  5%);  the 
variables associated to the typology of universities are no longer significant. Only universities 
without medical school are less likely (even unlikely) to appear as applicants together with 
companies.  
Finally,  consistent  with  previous  results,  patents  signed  by  academics  are  overall  in  the 
technology domain of Pharmaceuticals and life sciences, no matters the typology of applicant. 
 
 
                                                 
13 The negative and significant impact of public R&D for all categories is due to indirect effects: we suppose that 
this is mainly due to the importance of the R&D activity of PROs for those regions with low levels of R&D, 
where the involvement of private entities in collaborative agreements with faculty is low. 
Odds Std. Err. Odds Std. Err. Odds Std. Err. Odds Std. Err.
Ptype 1 3 4 5
0,84 0,41 2,09 1,03 0,27 0,31 0,7 0,74
0,73 0,47 1,07 0,96 1,12 1,47 2.70E-13 *** 2.14E-13
1,03 0,31 1,38 0,58 1,42 0,81 2,08 1,36
C_i 2191,2 11324,27 0 0 3.19E+08 ** 2.86E+09 2,52 34,9
Inst_int 332,94 3463,83 8.35E-13 * 1.34E-11 1.29E-09 3.01E-08 0,06 1,33
Uni_int 0 0 1.54E+16 ** 2.33E+17 4.81E-19 1.58E-17 1.38E+27 ** 3.62E+28
Gdp 1,26 0,35 1,11 0,29 1,93 0,88 1,75 1,19
Prrd 2,11 0,99 6.025 *** 3,62 3,2 2,35 1,83 1,96
Pbrd 0.319 *** 0,13 0.320 ** 0,17 0.279 ** 0,18 0.176 ** 0,14
Instr 1,27 0,3 1.796 ** 0,53 0,73 0,41 0,96 0,66
Bio 1.586** 0,37 3.177 *** 0,83 2.938 *** 1,22 2.273 * 1,14
Tto 1,74 0,65 3.893 ** 2,53 5,33 3,9 2,87 2,73
Act 0,84 0,21 2.607 *** 0,74 0,8 0,4 1,25 0,64
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6. Conclusions 
In this study we explored French academic patenting activity in the last decade and the impact 
of two major institutional changes which occurred before and during the time frame taken into 
account: the Innovation Act of 1999 and the opening of a technology transfer office in a 
university. 
As Azagra-Caro et al. (2006) have shown for the Université Louis Pasteur, it is common in 
France the habit of leaving to a business company the ownership of a patent whose inventor is 
an academic: in the whole country only 10% of the patents applications signed by faculty 
members have a university as assignee, being 222 out of 1744 patents. It is likely that this 
phenomenon was either unknown or largely underestimated by policy makers who pushed for 
the introduction of the Innovation Act. 
Furthermore, it has to be stated that the patenting activity is concentrated in some universities. 
The same universities had technology transfer offices well before the 1999, and persistently 
appear among the best scientific performing universities of the continent. 
The technology classes related to Chemistry and Pharmaceuticals are those in which faculty 
members are more active, together accounting for 53.5% of the academic invented patents. 
This outcome is consistent with whom is critical with the enthusiasm toward the Bay-Dole 
Act: in 2001 Mowery et al. suggested that the boast in academic patenting during the 1980s 
was rather due to the emergence of technological opportunities in the field of life sciences. 
Moreover, universities tend to appear as applicants in the class of pharmaceuticals, where 93 
patents have at least a university among the assignees.  
The econometric analysis shows that the passage of the Innovation Act resulted in a much 
more  aggressive  behaviour  of  French  universities  in  retaining  IPRs:  a  4.5%  increase  is 
recorded in the likelihood that a patent signed by an academic is applied for by the university 
they are affiliated to. The opening of a technology transfer office has even a stronger effect on 
the probability  a patent is assigned to the university of affiliation rather than to business 
companies (its marginal effect is equal to 7.2%), almost doubling the likelihood of academic 
assignment, after controlling for patent, university and regional characteristics.   
The  next  steps  in  this  analysis  will  be  to  test  whether  the  shift  of  ownership  attribution 
induced by the Innovation Act occurred independently or because of an increased propensity 
to patent by academic scientists. Measuring such propensity over time is not an easy task, 
since available methodologies (such as the one adopted here) trace only patents signed by 
academic scientists still active after 2000 (that is, they ignore patents signed by scientists who 
retired  before  then,  which  results  in  sever  underestimation  of  early  academic  patenting 
activity).  In  addition,  as  proved  by  a  number  of  recent  studies,  scientific  productivity, 
measured by publication activity, is a key determinant of a scientist’s likelihood to sign a new 
patent; this will require us more data collection efforts. 
On  the  policy  side,  we  will  also  have  to  test  whether  the  more  aggressive  stance  of 
universities towards IPR retention was beneficial or not for technology transfer and/or for the 
finances  of  universities.  By  no  means,  in  fact,  our  results  can  be  interpreted  as  proof  of 
“success” by the Innovation Act, until these two other aspects of its effect will be clarified. 
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Appendix 
 







BIO Dummy if patent belongs to biotech
INSTR,  Dummy if patent belongs to instrumentation
ENG,  Dummy if school of engineering
GRET,  Dummy if grand établissement
INP,  Dummy if institut national politechnique
UNI_MED,  Dummy if university with medical school
UNI_N_MED,  Dummy if university without medical school
SC_UNI,  Dummy if scientific university
C_INT,  Company patent intensity 
INST_INT,  PRO patent intensity 
UNI_INST,  University patent intensity 
SIZE1 Dummy if among 25% of larger universities
GDP Dummy if among 25% of larger regions 
PRRD Dummy if among 25% of regions with highest private R&D spending
PBRD Dummy if among 25% of regions with highest public R&D spending
ACT Dummy for 1999 onwards
TTO Dummy for opening TTO onwards